

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 3807

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: UK PAPER ON VERIFICATION

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF UK PAPER ON VERIDICATION WHICH UK DEL
DISTRIBUTED AT JULY 8 SPC. UK REP DREW ON SOME OF THE POINTS
IN THIS PAPER AT JULY 5 SPC AS REPORTED SEPTTEL.

BEGIN TEXT:

MBFR: VERIFICATION

PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION

1. A VERIFICATION SCHEME SHOULD SERVE BOTH TO DETER THE
WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES FROM ANY BREACH OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT AND TO
DETECT SUCH A BREACH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER IT OCCURES. THE
TWIN AIMS OF DETERRENCE AND DETECTION WILL ONLY BE ACHIEVED IF THE
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RUSSIANS ARE NOT ABLE TO CALCULATE THAT IF THEY EMPLOY DELIBERATE
CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION THEIR PREPARATIONS FOR WAR
INVOLVING BREACHES OF MBFR AGREEMENTS COULD GO UNDETECTED OR
UNCHALLENGED. A VERIFICATION SCHEME SHOULD BE DEvised WITH THIS

IN VIEW.

NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

2. A VERIFICATION SCHEME BASED ON STATIC PERIMETER POST ONLY WOULD BE CRITICALLY DEPENDENT ON NATIONAL MEANS OF INTELLIGENCE. IT WOULD BE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESTRICTION OF EXIT AND REENTRY OF FORCES TO CERTAIN FIXED POINTS COULD BE MONITORED BY NATIONAL MEANS. THE UNITED KINGDOM DOES NOT CONSIDER THAT ITS OWN INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY WOULD BE ADEQUATE FOR THIS MEANS. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW TO WHAT POINT OTHERS CONSIDER THEY HAVE THIS CAPABILITY BUT IT IS NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS ON RECORD AS INDICATING THAT THE CAPABILITY OF ITS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN THIS CONNECTION IS NOT ADEQUATE FOR THE PURPOSE. IN THE US PAPER OF 30 APRIL 1973 THE US AUTHORITIES STATE THAT

"WE WOULD HAVE HIGH CONFIDENCE OF DETECTING A 10PERCENT INCREASE IN PACT DIVISIONS- 3 STATIONED OR 3 INDIGENOUS-WITHIN ABOUT 90 DAYS" BUT THAT " UP TO A YEAR MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO DETECT (BUT NOT NECESSARILY MEASURE) AN AUGMENTATION OF SOVIET UNITS THROUGH AN INCREASE OF THE ORDER OF 20PERCENT IN MANPOWER OR EQUIPMENT - SOME 80,000 MEN OR 1,800 TANKS- IF THE INCREASE WERE MADE COVERTLY OVER TIME. SMALLER INCREASES, CARRIED OUT COVERTLY, MIGHT NEVER BE DETECTED." IF IT WOULD TAKE UP TO A YEAR TO DETECT A 20PERCENT INCREASE IN SOVIET UNITS, NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS ALONE WOULD BE NOTHING LIKE SUFFICIENT TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH A LIMITATION OF EXIT AND REENTRY TO CERTAIN FIXED POINTS.

3. THE ASSUMPTION THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT IS AT THE BASIS OF THE FEDERAL GERMAN PAPER ON VERIFICATION. THIS HAS RECEIVED CAREFUL STUDY BUT IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS THE UNITED KINGDOM CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT AN EFFECTIVE OVERT VERIFICATION SYSTEM WILL PROVE NECESSARY NOT ONLY TO OBSERVE WITHDRAWALS BUT TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH AN MBFR AGREEMENT. MOREOVER SINCE STATIC PERIMETER POSTS, EVEN IF CONTINUED AFTER WITHDRAWALS, WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO DETECT
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BREACHES OF THE AGREEMENT, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS WILL BE NECESSARY. INDEED WE BELIEVE A VERIFICATION SCHEME SHOULD BE BASED ON MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS RATHER THAN ON STATIC POSTS. WE DO NOT IMAGINE THAT ANY SUCH SCHEME COULD GUARANTEE 100PERCENT VERIFICATION. ITS SUCCESS WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON FACTORS SUCH AS THE NUMBER OF TEAMS EMPLOYED, THE DEGREE OF ACCESS THEY WERE ENTITLED TO , AND THE INTUITION(EVEN LUCK) IN THEIR TASKING- BUT WE THINK THAT IT OFFERS THE MOST EFFECTIVE PROSPECTS FOR BOTH DETERRENCE AND DETECTION. IT WOULD OF COURSE BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS HAD THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE FREEDOM OF ACCESS AND MOVEMENT AND THAT AS FEW AREAS AS POSSIBLE WERE CLOSED TO THEM. WE REGARD FREEDOM OF ACCESS AS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE PRECISE NUMBER OF TEAMS ALLOWED

TO BE DEPLOYED.

4. THE FEDERAL GERMAN PAPER DRAWS ATTENTION CLEARLY TO THE AWKWARD CONSEQUENCES THAT MIGHT ARISE IN THE COUNTRIES WHICH MUST RECEIVE VERIFICATION TEAMS. THE UNITED KINGDOM UNDERSTANDS THESE DIFFICULTIES BUT BELIEVES THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE BY ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES TOMAKE LESS POLITICALLY OBJECTIONABLE A VERIFICATION SCHMEM EFFECTIVE ENOUGH TO MEET THE TWIN AIMS OF DETERRENCE AND DETECTION. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF INSPECTION TEAMS BELOW THE LEVEL CURRENTLY PROPOSED, PROVIDED THAT THEIR FREEDOM OF ACCESS WAS ADEQUATE. IT COULD BE STIPULATED THAT THE TEAMS SHOULD NOT RESIDE PERMANENTLY IN THE AREA. IF IT WAS MORE CONVENIENT THAT THE TEAMS SHOULD BE AS INCONSPICUOUS AS POSSIBLE LO THE INHABITANTS OF THE HOST COUNTRY, RESTRICTION ON THE MARKING OF VEHICLES AND OTHER SIMILAR REGULATIONS TO THIS END WITHOUT RESTRICTING TOO DRASTICALLY THE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES OF AN INSPECTORATE. ALTERNATIVELY IF IT WAS THOUGHT PREFERABLE THAT THE TEAMS SHOULD ALWAYS BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED MEASURES TO THIS END COULD BE DEVISED. IN ANY CASE THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD SUPPORT PROVISIONS FOR HOST COUNTRY LIAISON OFFICERS TO BE ATTACHED TO INSPECTION TEAMS SO THAT THEIR ACTIVITIES IN ALLIED COUNTRIES COULD BE PROPERLY OBSERVED BY THE AUTHORITIES. END TEXT. PRENDERGAST

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